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Abstract
The rationalizability of a choice function on arbitrary domains by means of a transitive relation
has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. Moreover, characterizations of various versions of
consistent rationalizability have appeared in recent contributions. However, not much seems to
be known when the coherence property of quasi-transitivity or that of P-acyclicity is imposed on
a rationalization. The purpose of this paper is to ﬁll this signiﬁcant gap. We provide character-
izations of all forms of rationalizability involving quasi-transitive or P-acyclical rationalizations
on arbitrary domains. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation No.: D11.
Keywords: Rational Choice, Quasi-Transitivity, P-Acyclicity.
1 Introduction
The question whether observed (individual or social) choice behaviour can be generated by
some notion of optimization is one of the most fundamental issues in the analysis of economic
decisions. The basic question to be addressed is the following. Given some observed (or, at
least, observable) choices from feasible sets, does there exist a preference relation (possibly with
some additional properties) such that, for each choice situation under consideration, the set of
chosen objects is given by some set of ‘best’ elements according to this relation? There are two
basic forms of rationalizability, namely, greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element
rationalizability. Greatest-element rationalizability requires the existence of a relation such that,
for any feasible set in the domain of a choice function, the set of chosen elements coincides with
those elements of the feasible set that are at least as good as all feasible alternatives. Maximal-
element rationalizability, on the other hand, demands the existence of a relation such that the
set of chosen objects consists of all undominated elements in the feasible set, that is, all elements
such that there exists no feasible alternative that is strictly preferred.
In addition to the basic type of rationalizability (in terms of greatest elements or in terms
of maximal elements), we can require the rationalizing relation to be endowed with certain
fundamental properties. Two standard requirements are reﬂexivity and completeness, which we
refer to as richness properties because they require a relation to contain at least certain pairs of
alternatives. Furthermore, it is customary to impose coherence properties such as transitivity,
consistency, quasi-transitivity or P-acyclicity; see the following section for formal deﬁnitions.
Revealed preference theory has its origins in the theory of consumer demand, where the
choices to be analyzed are those of a competitive consumer from budget sets. This area of
research has been developed in contributions such as those of Samuelson (1938; 1947, Chapter
V; 1948; 1950) and Houthakker (1950).
Uzawa (1957) and Arrow (1959) considered alternative choice situations by introducing the
general concept of a choice function deﬁned on the domain of all subsets of a universal set of
alternatives. In this setting, Sen (1971), Schwartz (1976), Bandyopadhyay and Sengupta (1991),
to name but a few, characterized notions of rational choice under various coherence conditions
imposed on rationalizing relations. Most notably, the theory of rational choice on such rich
domains was greatly simpliﬁed by the equivalence results between several revealed preference
axioms, for example, the weak axiom of revealed preference and the strong axiom of revealed
preference, whose subtle diﬀerence had been regarded as lying at the heart of the integrability
problem for a competitive consumer.
Clearly, the above-described assumptions regarding the class of possible choice situations to
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be considered restrict the applicability of the results obtained. Thus, it is of great interest to
examine what the logic of rational choice—and nothing else—entails in general, irrespective of
the domain of a choice function. A crucial step along this line was taken by Richter (1966;
1971), Hansson (1968) and Suzumura (1976; 1977; 1983, Chapter 2) who assumed the domain
of a choice function to be an arbitrary family of non-empty subsets of an arbitrary non-empty
universal set of alternatives without any further structural assumptions.
While the theory of rational choice on arbitrary domains is well-developed if a rationalizing
relation is assumed to be transitive, much less is known when weaker coherence properties are im-
posed. The case of consistent rationalizability has been addressed recently in Bossert, Sprumont
and Suzumura (2005a). Furthermore, some versions of maximal-element rationalizability (and,
thus, those versions of greatest-element rationalizability that are equivalent to them) have been
characterized in Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005c) but a comprehensive treatment of
rationalizability on arbitrary domains in the presence of quasi-transitivity or P-acyclicity is still
missing. An analysis of some conditions that are necessary and others that are suﬃcient for some
forms of quasi-transitive or P-acyclical rationalizability can be found in Suzumura (1983) and
Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005b) but full characterizations of most of these concepts
have not yet been provided.
The purpose of this paper is to ﬁll the above-mentioned gap in the literature, thereby pro-
viding characterizations of all relevant notions of rationalizability on arbitrary domains. Thus,
the results of this paper provide systematic answers to some important open questions in the
literature on rational choice and revealed preference. It may be worth pointing out that answer-
ing these open questions have more substantial relevance than simply ﬁlling in logical lacunae in
the literature. Recollect that assuming the rationalizing weak preference relation to be transitive
entices strong empirical criticism. There are many experimental studies that suggest that the
imperfect discriminatory power of human beings leads to non-transitive indiﬀerence and Arm-
strong (1948, p.3) went as far as to assert: “That indiﬀerence is not transitive is indisputable,
and the world in which it were transitive is indeed unthinkable.” Thus, to liberate the theory
of rationalizable choice functions from the unsustainable assumption of transitive indiﬀerence
seems to be an important step for the sake of making the theoretical ediﬁce more of empirical
relevance than otherwise.
Our basic deﬁnitions and some preliminary observations are collected in Section 2. Section
3 introduces our diﬀerent notions of rationalizability and examines their logical relationships on
arbitrary domains. Section 4 is devoted to characterizations of all versions of rationalizability
involving no coherence properties, P-acyclicity or quasi-transitivity. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Preliminaries
We consider a non-empty (but otherwise arbitrary) universal set of alternatives X, and we let
R ⊆ X ×X be a (binary) relation on X. The asymmetric factor P (R) of R is deﬁned by
P (R) = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) /∈ R}.
The symmetric factor I(R) of R is deﬁned by
I(R) = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R}.
The non-comparable factor N(R) of R is deﬁned by
N(R) = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (x, y) /∈ R and (y, x) /∈ R}.
If R is interpreted as a weak preference relation, that is, (x, y) ∈ R means that x is considered at
least as good as y, then P (R), I(R) and N(R) can be interpreted as the strict preference relation,
the indiﬀerence relation and the non-comparability relation corresponding to R, respectively. The
diagonal relation on X is given by Rd = {(x, x) | x ∈ X}.
Let N denote the set of positive integers. The following properties of a binary relation R are
of importance in this paper.
Reﬂexivity. For all x ∈ X,
(x, x) ∈ R.
Completeness. For all x, y ∈ X such that x = y,
(x, y) ∈ R or (y, x) ∈ R.
Transitivity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ R and (y, z) ∈ R] ⇒ (x, z) ∈ R.
Quasi-transitivity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ P (R) and (y, z) ∈ P (R)] ⇒ (x, z) ∈ P (R).
Consistency. For all K ∈ N \ {1} and for all x0, . . . , xK ∈ X,
(xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} ⇒ (xK , x0) /∈ P (R).
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P-acyclicity. For all K ∈ N \ {1} and for all x0, . . . , xK ∈ X,
(xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} ⇒ (xK , x0) /∈ P (R).
A reﬂexive and transitive relation is called a quasi-ordering and a complete quasi-ordering is
called an ordering.
We refer to reﬂexivity and completeness as richness conditions. This term is motivated by
the observation that the properties in this group require that, at least, some pairs must belong to
the relation under consideration. In the case of reﬂexivity, all pairs of the form (x, x) are required
to be in the relation, whereas completeness demands that, for any two distinct alternatives x and
y, at least one of (x, y) and (y, x) must be in R. Clearly, the reﬂexivity requirement is equivalent
to the set inclusion Rd ⊆ R.
Transitivity, quasi-transitivity, consistency and P-acyclicity are coherence properties. They
require that if certain pairs belong to R, then certain other pairs must belong to R as well (as
is the case for transitivity and for quasi-transitivity) or certain other pairs cannot belong to R
(which applies to the cases of consistency and of P-acyclicity). Quasi-transitivity and consistency
are independent. A transitive relation is quasi-transitive, and a quasi-transitive relation is P-
acyclical. Moreover, a transitive relation is consistent, and a consistent relation is P-acyclical.
The reverse implications are not true in general. However, the distinction between transitivity
and consistency disappears for a reﬂexive and complete relation; see Suzumura (1983, p.244).
Thus, if a relation R on X is reﬂexive, complete and consistent, then R is transitive, hence an
ordering.
Transitivity is the classical coherence requirement on preference relations and its signiﬁcance
in theories of individual and collective choice is obvious. Quasi-transitivity was introduced by
Sen (1969; 1970, Chapter 1∗), and it has been employed in numerous approaches to the theory
of individual and social choice, including issues related to rationalizability. P-acyclicity has the
important property that it is not only suﬃcient for the existence of undominated choices from
any arbitrary ﬁnite subset of a universal set, but it is also necessary for the existence of such
choices from all possible ﬁnite subsets of the universal set; see Sen (1970, Chapter 1∗).
Violations of transitivity are quite likely to be observed in practical choice situations. For
instance, Luce’s (1956) well-known coﬀee-sugar example provides a plausible argument against
assuming that indiﬀerence is always transitive: the inability of a decision maker to perceive
‘small’ diﬀerences in alternatives is bound to lead to intransitivities. As this example illustrates,
transitivity frequently is too strong an assumption to impose in the context of individual choice.
In collective choice problems, it is even more evident that the plausibility of transitivity can be
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questioned. The concept of consistency, which is due to Suzumura (1976), is of particular interest
in this context. To underline its importance, note that this property is exactly what is required
to prevent the problem of a ‘money pump.’ If consistency is violated, there exists a preference
cycle with at least one strict preference. In this case, an agent with such preferences is willing
to trade (where ‘willingness to trade’ is assumed to require that the alternative acquired in the
trade is at least as good as that relinquished) an alternative xK for another alternative xK−1,
xK−1 for an alternative xK−2 and so on until we reach an alternative x0 such that the agent
strictly prefers getting back to xK to retaining possession of x0. Thus, at the end of a chain of
exchanges, the agent is willing to pay a positive amount in order to get back to the alternative
it had in its possession in the ﬁrst place—a classical example of a money pump.
There is yet another reason for the importance of the concept of consistency. As shown by
Suzumura (1976; 1983, Chapter 1), consistency is necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of
an ordering which subsumes all the pairwise information contained in the binary relation. This
result is a generalization of Szpilrajn’s (1930) classical result on extending quasi-orderings to
orderings.
Let X be the set of all non-empty subsets of X. We now introduce the concepts of greatestness
and maximality with respect to a relation. Suppose R is a relation on X and S ∈ X . The set
G(S,R) of all R-greatest elements of S is deﬁned by
G(S,R) = {x ∈ S | (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S} (1)
and the set M(S,R) of all R-maximal elements of S is deﬁned by
M(S,R) = {x ∈ S | (y, x) /∈ P (R) for all y ∈ S}.
As is straightforward to verify, G(S,R) ⊆ M(S,R) for all relations R on X and for all S ∈ X .
Furthermore, if R is reﬂexive and complete, then G(S,R) = M(S,R); for relations R that are
not reﬂexive or not complete, the set inclusion can be strict.
A choice function is a mapping that assigns, to each feasible set in its domain, a subset of
this feasible set. This subset is interpreted as the set of chosen alternatives. The domain of
the choice function depends on the choice situation to be analyzed, but it will always be a set
of subsets of X, that is, a subset of X . We assume this subset of X to be non-empty to avoid
degenerate situations. Thus, letting Σ ⊆ X be a non-empty domain, a choice function deﬁned
on that domain is a mapping C : Σ → X such that, for all S ∈ Σ, C(S) ⊆ S. The image of Σ
under C is given by C(Σ) = ∪S∈ΣC(S).
The direct revealed preference relation RC of a choice function C with domain Σ is deﬁned as
RC = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | ∃S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S}.
5
We conclude this section with the statement of a fundamental result regarding the existence
of ordering extensions. A relation R′ is an extension of a relation R if and only if (i) R ⊆ R′; and
(ii) P (R) ⊆ P (R′). Conversely, R is said to be a subrelation of R′ if and only if R′ is an extension
of R. The following classical theorem, which is a variant of the basic theorem due to Szpilrajn
(1930), speciﬁes a suﬃciency condition for the existence of an extension that is an ordering, to
be called an ordering extension. This convenient variant of Szpilrajn’s theorem was stated by
Arrow (1951, p.64) without a proof, whereas Hansson (1968) provided a full proof thereof on the
basis of Szpilrajn’s original theorem. Arrow (1951) and Suzumura (1976; 1983, Chapter 1; 2004)
provide generalizations of this result.
Theorem 1 Any quasi-ordering R on X has an ordering extension.
3 Deﬁnitions of Rationalizability
There are two basic forms of rationalizability properties that are commonly considered in the
literature. The ﬁrst is greatest-element rationalizability which requires the existence of a relation
such that, for any feasible set, every chosen alternative is at least as good as every alternative in
the set. Thus, this notion of rationalizability is based on the view that chosen alternatives should
weakly dominate all feasible alternatives. Maximal-element rationalizability, on the other hand,
demands the existence of a relation such that, for each feasible set, there exists no alternative
in this set that is strictly preferred to any one of the chosen alternatives. Hence, this version
of rationalizability does not require chosen alternatives to weakly dominate all elements of the
feasible set but, instead, demands that they are not strictly dominated by any other feasible
alternative.
In addition to one or the other of these two concepts of rationalizability, we have a choice
regarding the properties that we require a rationalizing relation to possess. We consider the
standard richness requirements of reﬂexivity and completeness and, in addition, the coherence
properties of transitivity, quasi-transitivity, consistency and P-acyclicity. By combining each
version of rationalizability with one or both (or none) of the richness conditions and with one (or
none) of the coherence properties, various deﬁnitions of rationalizability are obtained. Some of
these deﬁnitions are equivalent, others are independent, and some are implied by others. To get
an understanding of what each of these deﬁnitions entails, we summarize all logical relationships
between them in this section.
A choice function C is greatest-element rationalizable, G-rationalizable for short, if there exists
a relation R on X, to be called a G-rationalization of C, such that C(S) = G(S,R) for all S ∈ Σ.
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Analogously, a choice function C is maximal-element rationalizable, M-rationalizable for short, if
there exists a relation R on X, to be called an M-rationalization of C, such that C(S) = M(S,R)
for all S ∈ Σ. If a rationalization R is required to be reﬂexive and complete, the notion of greatest-
element rationalizability coincides with that of maximal-element rationalizability because, in this
case, G(S,R) = M(S,R) for all S ∈ X . Without these properties, however, this is not necessarily
the case. Greatest-element rationalizability is based on the idea of chosen alternatives weakly
dominating all alternatives in the feasible set under consideration, whereas maximal-element
rationalizability requires chosen elements not to be strictly dominated by any other feasible
alternative.
The following theorem presents a fundamental relationship between the direct revealed pref-
erence relation and a G-rationalization of a choice function. This observation, which is due to
Samuelson (1938; 1948), states that any G-rationalization of a G-rationalizable choice function
must respect the direct revealed preference relation of this choice function. This result follows
immediately from combining the deﬁnitions of the direct revealed preference relation RC and of
G-rationalizability.
Theorem 2 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆
X and R is a relation on X. If R is a G-rationalization of C, then RC ⊆ R.
An analogous set inclusion is not valid for M-rationalizability. An M-rationalization does not
necessarily have to respect the direct revealed preference relation because chosen alternatives
merely have to be undominated within the feasible set from which they are chosen. The only
restriction that is imposed is that the union of an M-rationalization and its non-comparable factor
must respect the revealed preference relation. This is a straightforward observation because
a strict preference of any feasible alternative over a chosen one immediately contradicts the
deﬁnition of M-rationalizability.
Depending on the additional properties that we might want to impose on a rationalization
(if any), diﬀerent notions of rationalizability can be deﬁned. For simplicity of presentation,
we use the following convention when formulating a rationalizability axiom. We distinguish
three groups of properties of a relation, namely, rationalization properties, richness properties
and coherence properties. The ﬁrst group consists of the two rationalizability properties of G-
rationalizability and M-rationalizability, the second of the two requirements of reﬂexivity and
completeness and, ﬁnally, the third of the axioms of transitivity, quasi-transitivity, consistency
and P-acyclicity. Greatest-element rationalizability is abbreviated by G, M is short for maximal-
element rationalizability, R stands for reﬂexivity and C is completeness. Transitivity, quasi-
transitivity, consistency and P-acyclicity are denoted by T, Q, S and A, respectively. We identify
7
the property or properties to be satisﬁed within each of the three groups and separate the groups
with hyphens. If none of the properties within a group is required, this is denoted by using
the symbol 0. Either greatest-element rationalizability or maximal-element rationalizability may
be required. In addition to imposing one of the two richness properties only, reﬂexivity and
completeness may be required simultaneously and we may require rationalizability properties
without either of the two. We only consider notions of rationalizability involving at most one of
the coherence properties at a time. As is the case for the richness properties, imposing none of
the coherence properties is a possibility. Formally, a rationalizability property is identiﬁed by an
expression of the form α-β-γ, where α ∈ {G,M}, β ∈ {RC,R,C, 0} and γ ∈ {T,Q,S,A, 0}.
For example, greatest-element rationalizability by a reﬂexive, complete and transitive relation
is denoted by G-RC-T, maximal-element rationalizability by a complete relation is M-C-0,
greatest-element rationalizability by a reﬂexive and consistent relation is G-R-S and maximal-
element rationalizability without any further properties of a rationalizing relation is M-0-0.
Clearly, according to this classiﬁcation, there are 2 · 4 · 5 = 40 versions of rationalizability.
We now provide a full description of the logical relationships between these diﬀerent notions of
rationalizability. This result synthesizes contributions due to Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura
(2005a; 2005b; 2005c) and, therefore, we do not provide a proof; see the original papers for details.
For convenience, a diagrammatic representation is employed. All axioms that are depicted within
the same box are equivalent, and an arrow pointing from one box b to another box b′ indicates
that the axioms in b imply those in b′, and the converse implication is not true. In addition, of
course, all implications resulting from chains of arrows depicted in the diagram are valid.
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Theorem 3 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆
X . Then
G-RC-T, G-C-T, G-R-T, G-0-T, G-RC-S, G-C-S, M-RC-T, M-C-T, M-RC-S, M-C-S
↓
G-RC-Q,M-R-T,M-0-T,
M-RC-Q,M-R-Q,M-C-Q,M-0-Q
→ G-C-Q → G-R-Q
↓ ↓
↓ ↓ G-0-Q
↓
G-RC-A,M-R-S,M-0-S,
M-RC-A,M-R-A,M-C-A,M-0-A
→ G-C-A → G-R-A, G-0-A ← G-R-S, G-0-S
↓ ↓
G-RC-0,G-C-0,M-RC-0,
M-R-0,M-C-0,M-0-0
→ G-R-0, G-0-0
Although the equivalences established in the above theorem reduce the number of distinct
notions of rationalizability from a possible forty to eleven, there remains a relatively rich set
of possible deﬁnitions. In particular, note that none of the coherence properties of transitivity,
quasi-transitivity, consistency and P-acyclicity is redundant: eliminating any one of them reduces
the number of distinct deﬁnitions, and so does the elimination of the versions not involving any
coherence property.
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out an important and remarkable diﬀerence between G-
rationalizability by a transitive or a consistent relation on the one hand and G-rationalizability
by a quasi-transitive or a P-acyclical relation on the other. In the case of G-rationalizability
with transitivity or consistency, the reﬂexivity requirement is redundant in all cases. That is,
irrespective of whether or not completeness is imposed as a richness condition, any version of
G-rationalizability with transitivity or consistency and without reﬂexivity is equivalent to the
deﬁnition that is obtained if reﬂexivity is added. This observation applies to the case where
no coherence property is imposed as well. In contrast, G-rationalizability by a complete and
quasi-transitive relation is not equivalent to G-rationalizability by a reﬂexive, complete and
quasi-transitive relation, and the same is true for the relationship between G-rationalizability by a
complete and P-acyclical relation and G-rationalizability by a reﬂexive, complete and P-acyclical
relation. In addition, while G-rationalizability by a P-acyclical relation and G-rationalizability
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by a reﬂexive and P-acyclical relation are equivalent, there is yet another discrepancy in the
quasi-transitive case: G-rationalizability by a quasi-transitive relation is not the same as G-
rationalizability by a reﬂexive and quasi-transitive relation.
In the case of M-rationalizability, only four distinct notions of rationalizability exist although,
in principle, there are twenty deﬁnitions, as in the case of G-rationalizability. This means that
there is a dramatic reduction of possible deﬁnitions due to the equivalences established in the the-
orem. Note that, within the set of deﬁnitions of M-rationalizability, there is a substantial degree
of redundancy. In particular, it is possible to generate all possible versions of M-rationalizability
with merely two coherence properties: any of the combinations of transitivity and consistency,
transitivity and P-acyclicity, quasi-transitivity and consistency is suﬃcient to obtain all four no-
tions of M-rationalizability (provided, of course, that the option of not imposing any coherence
property is retained). Moreover, reﬂexivity is redundant in all forms of M-rationalizability, irre-
spective of the coherence property imposed (if any), including quasi-transitivity and P-acyclicity:
any version of M-rationalizability without reﬂexivity is equivalent to the version obtained by
adding this richness property.
There is an interesting feature that distinguishes the notions of transitive or consistent M-
rationalizability from those involving quasi-transitivity, P-acyclicity or none of the coherence
properties. All four M-rationalizability properties involving quasi-transitivity are equivalent, and
so are all four notions involving P-acyclicity as well as the four versions without any coherence
property. In contrast, there are two distinct notions of transitive M-rationalizability and two
distinct notions of consistent M-rationalizability.
As is apparent from Theorem 3, M-rationalizability does not add any new versions of rational-
izability, provided that all deﬁnitions of G-rationalizability involving all of the four combinations
of coherence properties are present. Therefore, we can, without loss of generality, restrict atten-
tion to G-rationalizability in the characterization results stated in the following section.
4 Characterizations
This section constitutes the main contribution of the paper. We present necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for all notions of G-rationalizability involving quasi-transitivity or P-acyclicity as
the required coherence property, in addition to the version with completeness but without any
coherence property. We focus on these eight versions because the remaining three variants have
already been characterized by Richter (1966), Hansson (1968) and Suzumura (1977) in the case
of G-RC-T and its equivalents, by Richter (1971) in the case of G-R-0 and G-0-0 and by
Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005a) in the case of G-R-S and G-0-S. Moreover, the eight
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remaining versions can be dealt with in a uniﬁed framework as far as the nature of the conditions
involved is concerned. The results stated in the remainder of the paper are extremely general
because they apply to any arbitrary domain, and they serve to close an important gap in the
literature: they provide characterizations of all notions of rationalizability that have not been
axiomatized before.
The notions of rationalizability considered in this paper involve rather complex formulations of
necessary and suﬃcient conditions. The reason is that there is no such thing as a smallest quasi-
transitive relation or a smallest P-acyclical relation containing a given arbitrary relation, and
similar ambiguities exist in the absence of coherence properties when completeness is imposed.
In contrast, any relation R has a well-deﬁned transitive closure and a well-deﬁned consistent
closure which are, respectively, the smallest transitive relation containing R and the smallest
consistent relation containing R. Intuitively, when moving from R to its transitive or consistent
closure, pairs are added that are necessarily in any transitive or consistent relation containing
R. As soon as there exist alternatives x0, . . . , xK connecting two alternatives x and y via a
chain of weak preferences, transitivity demands that the pair (x, y) is included in any transitive
relation that contains R. Analogously, a chain of that nature implies that if, in addition, the
pair (y, x) is in R, (x, y) must be added if the resulting relation is to be consistent. In contrast,
there are no necessary additions to a relation in order to transform it into a quasi-transitive
relation by augmenting it. For instance, suppose we have (x, y) ∈ P (R), (y, z) ∈ P (R) and
(z, x) ∈ P (R). In order to deﬁne a quasi-transitive relation that contains R, at least two of the
three strict preferences must be converted into indiﬀerences but any two will do. Thus, there
is no unique smallest quasi-transitive relation containing R. Similarly, if we have a P-cycle,
a P-acyclical relation containing R merely has to have the property that at least one of the
pairs along the cycle, representing a strict preference, must be converted into an indiﬀerence.
But, without further information, there is nothing that forces this indiﬀerence on a speciﬁc
pair along the cycle. As a consequence, there is, in general, no smallest P-acyclical relation
containing an arbitrary relation R. The same diﬃculty arises when G-rationalizability involving
completeness without any coherence conditions is considered: there exists no unique smallest
complete relation containing a given incomplete relation. For that reason, we introduce some
further concepts in order to be able to formulate necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
deﬁnitions of rationalizability considered in this section.
Let C : Σ → X be a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ X , and deﬁne
AC = {(S, y) | S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \ C(S)}.
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For a choice function C such that AC = ∅, let
FC = {f : AC → X | f(S, y) ∈ S for all (S, y) ∈ AC}.
The set AC consists of all pairs of a feasible set and an element that belongs to the set but is not
chosen by C. If C(S) = S for all S ∈ Σ, the set AC is empty; in all other cases, AC = ∅. The
functions in FC have an intuitive interpretation. They assign a feasible element to each pair of
a feasible set S and an alternative y that is in S, but not chosen from S. Within the framework
of G-rationalizability, the intended interpretation is that f(S, y) is an alternative in S that can
be used to prevent y from being chosen in the sense that y is not at least as good as f(S, y)
according to a G-rationalization. Clearly, the existence of such an alternative for each (S, y) in
AC is a necessary condition for G-rationalizability.
We begin with the rationalizability property G-RC-0 (and, of course, its equivalents). To
do so, we introduce two crucial properties of a function f ∈ FC which prove instrumental in our
subsequent axiomatization. The ﬁrst imposes restrictions on the relationship between a choice
function C and a function f ∈ FC .
Direct exclusion (DRE). For all (S, y) ∈ AC , for all T ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ T ,
f(S, y) = x ⇒ y ∈ C(T ).
The interpretation of this condition is very intuitive, given the purpose of a function f as men-
tioned above. According to the deﬁnition of G-rationalizability, if x = f(S, y) ∈ S is responsible
for y being prevented from being chosen in S, then y is not at least as good as x according to a
G-rationalization of C. This being the case, y cannot possibly be chosen from any set containing
x because, according to G-rationalizability, such a choice would require that y be at least as
good as x, which we have just ruled out. Thus, provided that AC is non-empty, the existence
of a function f satisfying DRE clearly is necessary for G-rationalizability even if no richness or
coherence properties are imposed on a rationalization.
The second condition prevents a function f ∈ FC itself from exhibiting incoherent behavior,
without reference to its relationship with a choice function.
Direct irreversibility (DRI). For all (S, y), (T, x) ∈ AC,
[f(S, y) = x and x = y]⇒ f(T, x) = y.
The existence of a function f with this property is a consequence of requiring a G-rationalization
to be complete, given the interpretation of f alluded to above. Suppose f(S, y) = x and f(T, x) =
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y with distinct x, y ∈ X. According to the interpretation of f , this means that x is responsible
for keeping y out of C(S) and y is responsible for keeping x out of C(T ). By deﬁnition of
G-rationalizability, this means that, according to a G-rationalization, x fails to be at least as
good as y and, at the same time, y is not at least as good as x. But this is in conﬂict with the
completeness requirement.
Conversely, the existence of a function f with these two properties is suﬃcient for G-C-0
and its equivalents. This is by no means an obvious conclusion. There is a substantial amount
of work to be done in order to deduce the existence of a rationalization from the existence of
a function f with the required properties, and the same observation applies to the remaining
theorems of this section. The resulting characterization is a variant of a theorem due to Bossert,
Sprumont and Suzumura (2005c).
Theorem 4 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆
X . C satisﬁes any of G-RC-0, G-C-0, M-RC-0, M-R-0, M-C-0, M-0-0 if and only if,
whenever AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC satisfying DRE and DRI.
Proof. Using Theorem 3, it is suﬃcient to treat the case of G-C-0.
To prove the only if part of the theorem, let R be a complete G-rationalization of C, and
suppose AC = ∅. We deﬁne a function f ∈ FC as follows. Consider any (S, y) ∈ AC . The
assumption that R is a G-rationalization of C implies the existence of x ∈ S such that (y, x) ∈ R.
Let f(S, y) = x. We show that the function f has the required properties.
To show that DRE is satisﬁed, suppose (S, y) ∈ AC, T ∈ Σ and x ∈ T are such that
f(S, y) = x. By the deﬁnition of f , we obtain (y, x) ∈ R. Because R is a G-rationalization of C,
it follows that y ∈ C(T ).
To establish the property DRI, let (S, y), (T, x) ∈ AC and suppose f(S, y) = x and x = y.
The deﬁnition of f again implies (y, x) ∈ R. If f(T, x) = y, we obtain (x, y) ∈ R, a contradiction
to the completeness of R. Thus, f(T, x) = y.
We now prove the only if part of the theorem. If AC = ∅, R = X ×X clearly is a complete
G-rationalization of C. If AC = ∅, there exists a function f ∈ FC satisfying DRE and DRI.
Deﬁne
R = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = y}.
To prove that R is complete, suppose x, y ∈ X are such that x = y, (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R.
By deﬁnition, there exist S, T ∈ Σ such that (S, x), (T, y) ∈ AC , f(S, x) = y and f(T, y) = x,
contradicting the property DRI.
It remains to be shown that R is a G-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
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Suppose x ∈ C(S). If there exists y ∈ S such that (x, y) ∈ R, it follows from the deﬁnition
of R that there exists T ∈ Σ such that (T, x) ∈ AC and f(T, x) = y. But this contradicts the
property DRE and, therefore, x ∈ G(S,R).
Now suppose x ∈ C(S). Let y = f(S, x). By deﬁnition of R, we obtain (x, y) ∈ R and thus
x ∈ G(S,R).
The intuition underlying the deﬁnition of R in this result is quite straightforward. If x =
f(S, y) for distinct x, y ∈ X, it follows that y cannot be at least as good as x and, because of
the completeness requirement, this means that x must be better than y. The completeness of
the resulting relation R is a consequence of the assumption that f possesses the property DRI
and, moreover, R is a G-rationalization of C because f satisﬁes DRE.
Next, we characterize the rationalizability properties that are equivalent to G-0-A. As a
consequence of adding P-acyclicity as a requirement on a rationalization and removing the com-
pleteness condition, the property of direct irreversibility has to be replaced by the following
revelation irreversibility axiom.
Revelation irreversibility (RI). For all K ∈ N and for all (S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC ,
[
f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (xK , x0) ∈ RC
]
⇒ f(S0, x0) = xK .
Revelation irreversibility diﬀers from direct irreversibility in two ways. First, its conclusion
applies to chains of relationships between alternatives via f and not only to direct instances
thereof. Moreover, the axiom is conditional on any two consecutive elements in the chain being
related not only through f but also by means of a direct revealed preference according to C. As
is straightforward to verify, DRI and RI are independent.
RI is a consequence of the P-acyclicity of a G-rationalization. To see that this is the case,
note ﬁrst that, according to the interpretation of f , f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 means that xk cannot be at
least as good as xk−1 according to a G-rationalization. Furthermore, because the direct revealed
preference relation has to be respected by any G-rationalization, xk−1 must be at least as good
as xk, thus leading to a strict preference of xk−1 over xk. Thus, a violation of RI immediately
yields a violation of the P-acyclicity of a G-rationalization. Again, the existence of a function
f with the requisite properties not only is necessary but also suﬃcient for the rationalizability
deﬁnitions under consideration.
Theorem 5 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆
X . C satisﬁes any of G-R-A, G-0-A if and only if, whenever AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC
satisfying DRE and RI.
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Proof. By Theorem 3, it is suﬃcient to treat the case of G-0-A.
Suppose C satisﬁes G-0-A and let R be a P-acyclical G-rationalization of C. Suppose
AC = ∅. The assumption that R G-rationalizes C implies that, for any pair (S, y) ∈ AC , there
exists x ∈ S such that (y, x) ∈ R. Deﬁne f(S, y) = x. That f satisﬁes DRE follows as in the
previous theorem.
To establish the property RI, suppose K ∈ N and (S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC are such that
f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and, moreover, (xK , x0) ∈ RC . By
the deﬁnition of f , we obtain (xk, xk−1) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By Theorem 2, (xk−1, xk) ∈ R
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and, thus, (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. If f(S0, x0) = xK , it
follows that (x0, xK) ∈ R by deﬁnition. Because (xK , x0) ∈ RC implies (xK , x0) ∈ R by Theorem
2, we obtain (xK , x0) ∈ P (R). If K = 1, this contradicts the observation that (xK , x0) ∈ R,
which follows from the hypothesis f(S1, x1) = x0 and the deﬁnition of f . If K > 1, we obtain a
contradiction to the P-acyclicity of R. Therefore, f(S0, x0) = xK and RI is satisﬁed.
We now prove the if part of the theorem. If AC = ∅, R = X × X is a P-acyclical G-
rationalization of C. If AC = ∅, there exists a function f ∈ FC satisfying DRE and RI. Deﬁne
R = RC ∪ {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (y, x) ∈ RC and
 ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = y}.
To demonstrate that R is P-acyclical, suppose K ∈ N\{1} and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X are such that
(xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Consider any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By deﬁnition,
{(xk−1, xk) ∈ RC or [(xk, xk−1) ∈ RC and  ∃T k ∈ Σ such that
(T k, xk−1) ∈ AC and f(T k, xk−1) = xk]}
and
(xk, xk−1) ∈ RC and [(xk−1, xk) ∈ RC or ∃Sk ∈ Σ such that
(Sk, xk) ∈ AC and f(Sk, xk) = xk−1].
Because (xk, xk−1) ∈ RC must be true,
(xk, xk−1) ∈ RC and  ∃T k ∈ Σ such that (T k, xk−1) ∈ AC and f(T k, xk−1) = xk
cannot be true. Therefore, (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC must be true, which, in turn, implies that (xk−1, xk) ∈
RC cannot be true. Therefore, it follows that
(xk−1, xk) ∈ RC and ∃Sk ∈ Σ such that (Sk, xk) ∈ AC and f(Sk, xk) = xk−1.
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Using the same argument, it follows that (xK , x0) ∈ P (R) implies that (xK , x0) ∈ RC and there
exists S0 ∈ Σ such that (S0, x0) ∈ AC and f(S0, x0) = xK . This contradicts the property RI
and, thus, (xK , x0) ∈ P (R) and R is P-acyclical.
We complete the proof by showing that R is a G-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose x ∈ C(S). This implies (x, y) ∈ RC and, by Theorem 2, (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S.
Hence, x ∈ G(S,R).
Now suppose x ∈ C(S). Thus, (S, x) ∈ AC . Let y = f(S, x). If (x, y) ∈ RC , there exists
T ∈ Σ such that y ∈ T and x ∈ C(T ). Because y ∈ S, this contradicts the property DRE.
Therefore, (x, y) ∈ RC and, together with the observations (S, x) ∈ AC and y = f(S, x), it
follows that (x, y) ∈ R and hence x ∈ G(S,R).
As usual, any G-rationalization R has to respect the direct revealed preference relation RC .
Furthermore, the construction of R employed in the above theorem converts all strict direct
revealed preferences into indiﬀerences whenever this is possible without conﬂicting with the
interpretation of the function f . This is done to reduce the potential for conﬂicts with P-acyclicity
as much as possible. That the resulting relation satisﬁes the required properties follows from the
properties of f .
In order to accommodate completeness as well as P-acyclicity, we replace RI with the follow-
ing property of distinctness irreversibility.
Distinctness irreversibility (DSI). For all K ∈ N and for all (S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC,
[
f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x0] ⇒ f(S0, x0) = xK .
Clearly, distinctness irreversibility implies direct irreversibility (set K = 1 to verify this
claim). Although RI and DSI by themselves are independent, DSI implies RI in the presence
of direct exclusion. To see that this is the case, suppose f violates RI. Then there exist K ∈ N
and (S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈
{1, . . . , K}, (xK , x0) ∈ RC and f(S0, x0) = xK . If any two consecutive elements in this cycle are
distinct, we immediately obtain a contradiction to DSI. If xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, it
follows that f(S0, x0) = x0 and (x0, x0) ∈ RC . By deﬁnition of RC , there exists T ∈ Σ such that
x0 ∈ C(T ) ⊆ T , contradicting DRE.
The property of DSI rather than of RI must be added to DRE if a rationalization is to
be complete in addition to being P-acyclical. If DSI is violated, the completeness of a G-
rationalization and the interpretation of f together imply that a G-rationalization must have a
strict preference cycle, which immediately yields a contradiction to the P-acyclicity requirement.
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The following theorem establishes that the existence of a function f satisfying DRE and DSI
is necessary and suﬃcient for the rationalizability properties that are equivalent to G-C-A.
Theorem 6 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆
X . C satisﬁes G-C-A if and only if, whenever AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC satisfying DRE
and DSI.
Proof. First, suppose C satisﬁes G-C-A and let R be a complete and P-acyclical G-rationalization
of C. Suppose AC = ∅. The assumption that R G-rationalizes C implies that, for any pair
(S, y) ∈ AC , there exists x ∈ S such that (y, x) ∈ R. Deﬁne f(S, y) = x.
To prove that f satisﬁes DRE, suppose (S, y) ∈ AC , T ∈ Σ and x ∈ T are such that
f(S, y) = x. By the deﬁnition of f , we obtain (y, x) ∈ R. Because R is a G-rationalization of C,
it follows that y ∈ C(T ).
To establish the property DSI, suppose K ∈ N and (S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC are such
that f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and, furthermore, xK = x0. By
the deﬁnition of f , it follows that (xk, xk−1) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Because R is complete
and xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} by assumption, it follows that (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. If f(S0, x0) = xK , it follows that (x0, xK) ∈ R by deﬁnition and, by the
assumption xK = x0 and the completeness of R, we obtain (xK, x0) ∈ P (R). If K = 1, this
contradicts the observation that (xK , x0) ∈ R which follows from the hypothesis f(S1, x1) = x0
and the deﬁnition of f . If K > 1, we obtain a contradiction to the P-acyclicity of R. Therefore,
f(S0, x0) = xK.
We now prove the if part of the theorem. If AC = ∅, R = X ×X is a complete P-acyclical
G-rationalization of C. If AC = ∅, there exists a function f ∈ FC satisfying DRE and DSI.
Deﬁne
R = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = y}.
We prove that R is complete. By way of contradiction, suppose x, y ∈ X are such that x = y,
(x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R. By the deﬁnition of R, this implies that there exist S, T ∈ Σ such that
(S, x), (T, y) ∈ AC , f(S, x) = y and f(T, y) = x. Because x = y, this contradicts the property
DSI. Thus, R is complete.
To show that R is P-acyclical, suppose K ∈ N \ {1} and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X are such that
(xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By the deﬁnition of R, this implies that there exist
S1, . . . , SK ∈ Σ such that (Sk, xk) ∈ AC and xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Moreover,
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, there exists no T k ∈ Σ such that (T k, xk−1) ∈ AC and xk = f(T k, xk−1).
This implies xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. If (xK , x0) ∈ P (R), there exists S0 ∈ Σ such that
(S0, x0) ∈ AC and xK = f(S0, x0). Furthermore, there exists no T 0 ∈ Σ such that (T 0, xK) ∈ AC
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and x0 = f(T 0, xK). This implies x0 = xK and we obtain a contradiction to the property DSI
and, thus, (xK , x0) ∈ P (R) and R is P-acyclical.
It remains to be shown that R is a G-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose x ∈ C(S). If there exist y ∈ S and T ∈ Σ such that (T, x) ∈ AC and f(T, x) = y,
we obtain a contradiction to the property DRE. Thus, by deﬁnition, (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S
and hence x ∈ G(S,R).
Now suppose x ∈ C(S). Let y = f(S, x). By the deﬁnition of R, this implies (x, y) ∈ R and,
therefore, x ∈ G(S,R).
The intuition underlying the deﬁnition of R in this result is quite straightforward. If x =
f(S, y), it follows that y cannot be at least as good as x and, because of the completeness
assumption, this means that x must be better than y whenever x = y. The resulting relation
has all the required properties as a consequence of the properties of f .
Our last set of rationalizability properties involving P-acyclical G-rationalizations is that
containing G-RC-A. Because reﬂexivity is added as a requirement, an unconditional version of
irreversibility is called for.
Indirect irreversibility (II). For all K ∈ N and for all (S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC,
f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} ⇒ f(S0, x0) = xK .
Clearly, indirect irreversibility implies all of the irreversibility conditions introduced earlier. The
full force of the axiom is needed because, as opposed to the G-rationalizability G-C-A, its
conclusion must hold not only for chains of distinct alternatives but, due to the added reﬂexivity
assumption, for any chain. We obtain the following characterization which, with a slightly
diﬀerent proof, can be found in Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005c).
Theorem 7 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆
X . C satisﬁes any of G-RC-A, M-R-S, M-0-S, M-RC-A, M-R-A, M-C-A, M-0-A if and
only if, whenever AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC satisfying DRE and II.
Proof. Invoking Theorem 3 again, it is suﬃcient to consider G-RC-A.
We ﬁrst prove the only if part of the theorem. Let R be a reﬂexive, complete and P-acyclical
G-rationalization of C. Suppose AC = ∅ and consider an arbitrary pair (S, y) ∈ AC. By
deﬁnition, S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \ C(S). The assumption that R is a G-rationalization of C implies
the existence of x ∈ S such that (y, x) ∈ R. Deﬁne f(S, y) = x.
18
To prove that f satisﬁes DRE, suppose (S, y) ∈ AC , T ∈ Σ and x ∈ T are such that
f(S, y) = x. By the deﬁnition of f , we obtain (y, x) ∈ R. Because R is a G-rationalization of C,
it follows that y ∈ C(T ).
To establish the property II, suppose K ∈ N and (S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC are such that
f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By deﬁnition, (xk, xk−1) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Because R is reﬂexive, we have xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and, thus, the completeness of
R implies (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. If f(S0, x0) = xK , it follows analogously
that (xK , x0) ∈ P (R). If K = 1, this contradicts the hypothesis (xK , x0) ∈ R, and if K > 1, we
obtain a contradiction to the P-acyclicity of R. Therefore, f(S0, x0) = xK .
Next, we prove the if part of the theorem. If AC = ∅, R = X × X clearly is a reﬂexive,
complete and P-acyclical G-rationalization of C. If AC = ∅, there exists a function f ∈ FC
satisfying DRE and II. Deﬁne
R = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = y}.
To prove that R is reﬂexive, suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists x ∈ X such
that (x, x) ∈ R. By deﬁnition, there exists S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = x. Letting
K = 1, S0 = SK = S and x0 = xK = x, we obtain a contradiction to the property II.
Next, we establish the completeness of R. Suppose x, y ∈ X are such that x = y, (x, y) ∈ R
and (y, x) ∈ R. By deﬁnition, there exist S, T ∈ Σ such that (S, x), (T, y) ∈ AC , f(S, x) = y and
f(T, y) = x, contradicting the property II for K = 1, (S0, x0) = (S, x) and (SK, xK) = (T, y).
To show that R is P-acyclical, suppose K ∈ N \ {1} and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X are such that
(xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By the deﬁnition of R, this implies that there exist
S1, . . . , SK ∈ Σ such that (Sk, xk) ∈ AC and xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. If
(xK , x0) ∈ P (R), there exists S0 ∈ Σ such that (S0, x0) ∈ AC and xK = f(S0, x0). But this
contradicts the property II. Thus, (xK, x0) ∈ P (R) and R is P-acyclical.
It remains to be shown that R is a G-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose x ∈ C(S). If there exists y ∈ S such that (x, y) ∈ R, it follows from the deﬁnition
of R that there exists T ∈ Σ such that (T, x) ∈ AC and f(T, x) = y. But this contradicts the
property DRE and, therefore, x ∈ G(S,R).
Now suppose x ∈ C(S). Let y = f(S, x). By the deﬁnition of R, we obtain (x, y) ∈ R and
thus x ∈ G(S,R).
The intuition underlying the deﬁnition of R in this result is as follows. If x = f(S, y), it
follows that y cannot be at least as good as x and, because of reﬂexivity and completeness, this
means that x must be better than y. As opposed to the previous result, f satisﬁes II rather than
merely DSI and, as a consequence, R is reﬂexive in addition to being complete and P-acyclical.
19
We now turn to rationalizability properties involving quasi-transitivity as the coherence prop-
erty to be satisﬁed by a G-rationalization. We begin with G-0-Q. According to Theorem 5, the
existence of a function f satisfying DRE and RI is necessary and suﬃcient for G-0-A. If P-
acyclicity is strengthened to quasi-transitivity, the following additional property of f is required.
Revelation exclusion (RE). For all K ∈ N, for all (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC, for all S0 ∈ Σ
and for all x0 ∈ S0,
[
f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
] ⇒ xK ∈ C(S0).
Revelation exclusion is necessary to ensure that a G-rationalization is quasi-transitive as opposed
to merely P-acyclical. As illustrated earlier, the conjunction of f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and (xk−1, xk) ∈
RC implies, given the interpretation of f , that a G-rationalization must exhibit a strict preference.
Following the resulting chain of strict preferences, quasi-transitivity demands that x0 is strictly
preferred to xK according to the rationalization. This is incompatible with (xK , x0) ∈ RC and,
thus, RE must be satisﬁed. We obtain the following characterization.
Theorem 8 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆
X . C satisﬁes G-0-Q if and only if, whenever AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC satisfying DRE,
RE and RI.
Proof. Suppose C satisﬁes G-0-Q and let R be a quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C.
Suppose AC = ∅ and consider any (S, y) ∈ AC . By deﬁnition, S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \ C(S). The
assumption that R is a G-rationalization of C implies the existence of x ∈ S such that (y, x) ∈ R.
Deﬁne f(S, y) = x.
To prove that f satisﬁes DRE, suppose (S, y) ∈ AC , T ∈ Σ and x ∈ T are such that
f(S, y) = x. By the deﬁnition of f , we obtain (y, x) ∈ R. Because R is a G-rationalization of C,
it follows that y ∈ C(T ).
To show that f satisﬁes RE, suppose K ∈ N, (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC , S0 ∈ Σ and
x0 ∈ S0 are such that f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By the
deﬁnition of f , (xk, xk−1) ∈ R and by Theorem 2, (xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Thus,
(xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and the quasi-transitivity of R implies (x0, xK) ∈ P (R).
Therefore, (xK , x0) ∈ R and, because R is a G-rationalization of C, we obtain xK ∈ C(S0).
To establish the property RI, suppose K ∈ N and (S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC are such
that f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (xK , x0) ∈ RC . By
the deﬁnition of f , (xk, xk−1) ∈ R and by Theorem 2, (xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Therefore, (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. R being quasi-transitive, it follows that
(x0, xK) ∈ P (R) and thus (x0, xK) ∈ R, which, by the deﬁnition of f , implies f(S0, x0) = xK .
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Now suppose that there exists f ∈ FC satisfying DRE, RE and RI whenever AC = ∅. If
AC = ∅, R = X × X is a quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C and we are done. If AC = ∅,
there exists a function f ∈ FC satisfying the properties DRE, RE and RI. Deﬁne
R = RC
∪ {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (y, x) ∈ RC and  ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = y
and  ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that
y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x}
∪ {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that
x = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y}.
To prove that R is quasi-transitive, suppose x, y, z ∈ X are such that (x, y) ∈ P (R) and
(y, z) ∈ P (R). By deﬁnition, (x, y) ∈ R implies
(x, y) ∈ RC (2)
or
(y, x) ∈ RC and  ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = y
and  ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (3)
y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x
or
∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (4)
x = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y.
Analogously, (y, x) ∈ R implies
(y, x) ∈ RC (5)
and
(x, y) ∈ RC or ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, y) ∈ AC and f(S, y) = x
or ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (6)
x = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y
and
 ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (7)
y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x.
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Because (5) must be true, (3) must be false. Therefore, it follows that (2) or (4) is true and that
(6) is true. Because (2) and (x, y) ∈ RC are incompatible, it follows that we must have
(2) and ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, y) ∈ AC and f(S, y) = x (8)
or
(2) and (4) (9)
or (4). Clearly, (8) implies (4) and (9) implies (4) trivially. Thus, (4) follows in all possible cases.
Analogously, (y, z) ∈ P (R) implies
∃L ∈ N, y0 ∈ X and (T 1, y1), . . . , (TL, yL) ∈ AC such that (10)
y = y0, y−1 = f(T , y) and (y−1, y) ∈ RC for all  ∈ {1, . . . , L} and yL = z.
Letting M = K + L, z0 = x0, (Um, zm) = (Sm, xm) for all m ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (Um, zm) =
(Tm−K, ym−K) for all m ∈ {K + 1, . . . , K + L}, (4) and (10) together imply
x = z0, zm−1 = f(Um, zm) and (zm−1, zm) ∈ RC for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and zM = z. (11)
Therefore, by the deﬁnition of R, (x, z) ∈ R. Suppose we also have (z, x) ∈ R. This implies
(z, x) ∈ RC (12)
or
(x, z) ∈ RC and  ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, z) ∈ AC and f(S, z) = x
and  ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (13)
x = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = z
or
∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (14)
z = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x.
If (12) is true, (11) yields a contradiction to the property RE. (13) immediately contradicts (11).
Finally, if (14) applies, combining it with (11), we are led to a contradiction to the property RI.
Thus, R is quasi-transitive.
To show that R is a G-rationalization of C, let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose x ∈ C(S). This implies (x, y) ∈ RC ⊆ R for all y ∈ S and, therefore, x ∈ G(S,R).
Now suppose x ∈ C(S). Thus, (S, x) ∈ AC . Let y = f(S, x) and suppose (x, y) ∈ R.
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If (x, y) ∈ RC , there exists T ∈ Σ such that y ∈ T and x ∈ C(T ). This contradicts the
property DRE. If (3) applies, it follows that there exists no S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and
y = f(S, x), an immediate contradiction to our hypothesis. Finally, if (4) applies, we obtain a
contradiction to the property RI. Thus, (x, y) ∈ R and hence x ∈ G(S,R).
In the above proof, the components of R are constructed by including all pairs that are
necessarily in this relation and then invoking the properties of f to ensure that R satisﬁes all
of the requirements. In particular, as is the case whenever G-rationalizability is considered, the
direct revealed preference relation RC has to be respected. To avoid as many potential conﬂicts
with quasi-transitivity as possible, any strict revealed preference is converted into an indiﬀerence
whenever possible without contradiction. Finally, any chain of strict preference imposed by the
conjunction of relationships imposed by f and by the direct revealed preference criterion has to
be respected due to the quasi-transitivity requirement.
If reﬂexivity is added to quasi-transitivity as a requirement on a G-rationalization, the func-
tion f must possess an additional property as well. This is accomplished by imposing the
following axiom.
Self irreversibility (SI). For all (S, x) ∈ AC ,
f(S, x) = x.
According to the interpretation of f , f(S, x) = x means that x is excluded from C(S) because x
fails to be considered at least as good as itself by a G-rationalization. Clearly, this is incompatible
with the reﬂexivity of a G-rationalization and, thus, self irreversibility is an additional necessary
requirement to be satisﬁed by f . This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 9 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆
X . C satisﬁes G-R-Q if and only if, whenever AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC satisfying DRE,
RE, RI and SI.
Proof. Suppose C satisﬁes G-R-Q and let R be a reﬂexive and quasi-transitive G-rationalization
of C. Suppose AC = ∅ and consider any (S, y) ∈ AC . By deﬁnition, S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \ C(S).
The assumption that R is a G-rationalization of C implies the existence of x ∈ S such that
(y, x) ∈ R. Deﬁne f(S, y) = x.
To prove that f satisﬁes DRE, suppose (S, y) ∈ AC , T ∈ Σ and x ∈ T are such that
f(S, y) = x. By the deﬁnition of f , we obtain (y, x) ∈ R. Because R is a G-rationalization of C,
it follows that y ∈ C(T ).
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To show that f satisﬁes RE, suppose K ∈ N, (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC , S0 ∈ Σ and
x0 ∈ S0 are such that f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By the
deﬁnition of f , (xk, xk−1) ∈ R and by Theorem 2, (xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Thus,
(xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and the quasi-transitivity of R implies (x0, xK) ∈ P (R).
Therefore, (xK , x0) ∈ R and, because R is a G-rationalization of C, we obtain xK ∈ C(S0).
To establish the property RI, suppose K ∈ N and (S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC are such
that f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (xK , x0) ∈ RC . By
the deﬁnition of f , (xk, xk−1) ∈ R and by Theorem 2, (xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Therefore, (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. R being quasi-transitive, it follows that
(x0, xK) ∈ P (R) and thus (x0, xK) ∈ R which, by the deﬁnition of f , implies f(S0, x0) = xK .
To prove that SI is satisﬁed, suppose there exists (S, x) ∈ AC such that f(S, x) = x. By the
deﬁnition of f , this implies (x, x) ∈ R, contradicting the reﬂexivity of R.
Suppose that, whenever AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC satisfying DRE, RE, RI and SI. If
AC = ∅, R = X ×X is a reﬂexive and quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C and we are done.
If AC = ∅, there exists a function f ∈ FC satisfying DRE, RE, RI and SI. Deﬁne
R = RC ∪ Rd
∪ {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (y, x) ∈ RC and  ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = y
and  ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that
y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x}
∪ {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that
x = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y}.
Clearly, R is reﬂexive because Rd ⊆ R.
To prove that R is quasi-transitive, suppose x, y, z ∈ X are such that (x, y) ∈ P (R) and
(y, z) ∈ P (R). This implies that x = y and y = z and, thus, (x, y) ∈ Rd and (y, z) ∈ Rd.
Therefore, (x, y) ∈ R implies
(x, y) ∈ RC (15)
or
(y, x) ∈ RC and  ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = y
and  ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (16)
y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x
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or
∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (17)
x = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y.
Analogously, (y, x) ∈ R implies
(y, x) ∈ RC (18)
and
(x, y) ∈ RC or ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, y) ∈ AC and f(S, y) = x
or ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (19)
x = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y
and
 ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (20)
y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x.
Because (18) must be true, (16) must be false. Therefore, it follows that (15) or (17) is true and
that (19) is true. Because (15) and (x, y) ∈ RC are incompatible, it follows that we must have
(15) and ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, y) ∈ AC and f(S, y) = x (21)
or
(15) and (17) (22)
or (17). Clearly, (21) implies (17) and (22) implies (17) trivially. Thus, (17) follows in all possible
cases. Analogously, (y, z) ∈ P (R) implies
∃L ∈ N, y0 ∈ X and (T 1, y1), . . . , (TL, yL) ∈ AC such that (23)
y = y0, y−1 = f(T , y) and (y−1, y) ∈ RC for all  ∈ {1, . . . , L} and yL = z.
Letting M = K + L, z0 = x0, (Um, zm) = (Sm, xm) for all m ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (Um, zm) =
(Tm−K, ym−K) for all m ∈ {K + 1, . . . , K + L}, (17) and (23) together imply
x = z0, zm−1 = f(Um, zm) and (zm−1, zm) ∈ RC for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and zM = z. (24)
Therefore, by the deﬁnition of R, (x, z) ∈ R. Suppose we also have (z, x) ∈ R. This implies
(z, x) ∈ RC (25)
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or
(x, z) ∈ RC and  ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, z) ∈ AC and f(S, z) = x
and  ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (26)
x = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = z
or
∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that (27)
z = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x.
If (25) is true, (24) yields a contradiction to the property RE. (26) immediately contradicts (24).
Finally, if (27) applies, in combination with (24), it implies a contradiction to the property RI.
Thus, R is quasi-transitive.
To show that R is a G-rationalization of C, let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose x ∈ C(S). This implies (x, y) ∈ RC ⊆ R for all y ∈ S and, therefore, x ∈ G(S,R).
Now suppose x ∈ C(S). Thus, (S, x) ∈ AC . Let y = f(S, x) and suppose (x, y) ∈ R.
If (x, y) ∈ RC , there exists T ∈ Σ such that y ∈ T and x ∈ C(T ). This contradicts the
property DRE. If (x, y) ∈ Rd, we obtain a contradiction to the property SI. If (16) applies,
it follows that there exists no S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and y = f(S, x), an immediate
contradiction to our hypothesis. Finally, if (17) applies, we obtain a contradiction to the property
RI. Thus, (x, y) ∈ R and hence x ∈ G(S,R).
The construction of the G-rationalization in this proof is analogous to that of the previous
theorem. The only diﬀerence is that diagonal relation Rd appears now. This is necessitated by
the addition of reﬂexivity as a requirement.
If completeness rather than reﬂexivity is added to quasi-transitivity, we obtain a stronger
rationalizability condition; see Theorem 3. As a consequence, the property RI of f in Theorem
8 is replaced by DSI and, instead of RE, the following requirement is imposed.
Distinctness exclusion (DSE). For all K ∈ N, for all (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC , for all
S0 ∈ Σ and for all x0 ∈ S0,
[
f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}]⇒ xK ∈ C(S0).
In the presence ofDRE,RE is implied by DSE. Suppose f violates RE. If all xk are identical, we
obtain an immediate contradiction to DRE. If there exists a k ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that xk−1 = x0,
we can without loss of generality assume that all of them are pairwise distinct (otherwise, the
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chain can be reduced to one involving pairwise distinct elements), which leads to a violation of
DSE.
The strengthening of revelation exclusion to distinctness exclusion is necessary as a con-
sequence of adding completeness to quasi-transitivity. If f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and xk−1 = xK ,
the interpretation of f and the completeness of a G-rationalization together imply that xk−1 is
strictly preferred to xk. Following this chain of strict preferences, quasi-transitivity demands that
x0 is strictly preferred to xK , which is not compatible with (xK , x0) ∈ RC . The corresponding
characterization result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 10 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain
Σ ⊆ X . C satisﬁes G-C-Q if and only if, whenever AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC satisfying
DRE, DSE and DSI.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that G-C-Q implies the existence of f ∈ FC which satisﬁes DRE, DSE
and DSI whenever AC = ∅. Let R be a complete and quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C.
Consider any (S, y) ∈ AC . By deﬁnition, S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \ C(S). The assumption that R is a
G-rationalization of C implies the existence of x ∈ S such that (y, x) ∈ R. Deﬁne f(S, y) = x.
To show that f satisﬁes DRE, suppose (S, y) ∈ AC , T ∈ Σ and x ∈ T are such that
f(S, y) = x. By the deﬁnition of f , we have (y, x) ∈ R. Because R is a G-rationalization of C,
it follows that y ∈ C(T ).
To prove that f satisﬁes DSE, let K ∈ N, (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC , S0 ∈ Σ and x0 ∈ S0
be such that f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By deﬁnition, (xk, xk−1) ∈ R
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and the completeness of R implies (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
R being quasi-transitive, it follows that (x0, xK) ∈ P (R) and, thus, (xK , x0) ∈ R. Because R is
a G-rationalization of C, we obtain xK ∈ C(S0).
The ﬁnal property of the function f that remains to be established isDSI. Suppose K ∈ N and
(S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC are such that f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 and xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
By deﬁnition, (xk, xk−1) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and, because R is complete, (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. R being quasi-transitive, it follows that (x0, xK) ∈ P (R) and hence
(x0, xK) ∈ R. By the deﬁnition of f , this implies f(S0, x0) = xK.
Now suppose that, whenever AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC satisfying DRE, DSE and DSI.
If AC = ∅, R = X × X is a complete and quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C and we are
done. If AC = ∅, there exists a function f ∈ FC satisfying DRE, DSE and DSI. Deﬁne
R = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that
y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x}
\ {(x, x) ∈ Rd | ∃S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = x}.
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To prove that R is complete, suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist x, y ∈ X such
that x = y, (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R. By deﬁnition, this implies that there exist K,L ∈ N,
x0, y0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK), (T 1, y1), . . . , (TL, yL) ∈ AC such that y = x0, xk−1 =
f(Sk, xk) and xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, xK = x, x = y0, y−1 = f(T , y) and y−1 = y for
all  ∈ {1, . . . , L} and yL = y. Letting M = K+L−1, (U0, z0) = (TL, yL), (Um, zm) = (Sm, xm)
for all m ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (Um, zm) = (Tm−K, ym−K) for all m ∈ {K +1, . . . , K +L}\{K +L},
it follows that zm−1 = f(Um, zm) and zm−1 = zm for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and zM = f(U0, z0),
contradicting the property DSI.
Next, we show that R is quasi-transitive. Suppose x, y, z ∈ X are such that (x, y) ∈ P (R)
and (y, z) ∈ P (R). This implies that x = y and y = z and, by the deﬁnition of R, there exist
K,L ∈ N, x0, y0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK), (T 1, y1), . . . , (TL, yL) ∈ AC such that x = x0,
xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, xK = y, y = y0, y−1 = f(T , y) and
y−1 = y for all  ∈ {1, . . . , L} and yL = z. Letting M = K + L, z0 = x0, (Um, zm) = (Sm, xm)
for all m ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (Um, zm) = (Tm−K, ym−K) for all m ∈ {K +1, . . . , K +L}, it follows
that (z, x) ∈ R. Because R is complete, we obtain (x, z) ∈ P (R).
Finally, we prove that R is a G-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose ﬁrst that x ∈ C(S) and, by way of contradiction, that there exists y ∈ S such that
(x, y) ∈ R. If x = y and there exists S ∈ Σ such that (S, x) ∈ AC and f(S, x) = x, we obtain a
contradiction to the property DRE. If there exist K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈
AC such that y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) and xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x,
letting S0 = S yields a contradiction to the property DSE. Therefore, x ∈ G(S,R). Thus,
C(S) ⊆ G(S,R).
Now suppose x ∈ C(S). Let y = f(S, x). By deﬁnition, this implies (x, y) ∈ R and hence
x ∈ G(S,R). Thus, G(S,R) ⊆ C(S).
The G-rationalization R employed in this proof is less complex because of the completeness
assumption—an absence of a weak preference for one of two distinct alternatives implies a strict
preference for the other. In addition, whenever an element x is not chosen in a set S because,
according to f , x is not at least as good as itself, the pair (x, x) cannot be in R. Because R is also
required to be quasi-transitive, chains of strict preference have to be respected as well. In order
to arrive at a complete and quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C, we deﬁne R to be composed
of all pairs (x, y) ∈ X × X such that y does not have to be strictly preferred to x according
to the above-described criterion. The properties of f ensure that R is indeed a complete and
quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C.
Finally, we consider the rationalizability property G-RC-Q. Because reﬂexivity and com-
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pleteness are required, both the exclusion axiom and the irreversibility condition to be employed
are unconditional—whenever it is the case that f(Sk, xk) = xk−1, the conjunction of reﬂexiv-
ity and completeness, together with the interpretation of f , implies that xk−1 must be strictly
preferred to xk by a G-rationalization. Quasi-transitivity demands that any chain of strict prefer-
ences from x0 to xK be respected and, thus, x0 must be strictly preferred to xK . This immediately
rules out (xK, x0) ∈ RC (as required by the axiom IE introduced below) and f(S0, x0) = xK (see
II).
Indirect exclusion (IE). For all K ∈ N, for all (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC , for all S0 ∈ Σ and
for all x0 ∈ S0,
f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} ⇒ xK ∈ C(S0).
Clearly, indirect exclusion implies all of the exclusion properties introduced earlier. We can now
state our ﬁnal result which, with an alternative proof, has been established in Bossert, Sprumont
and Suzumura (2005c).
Theorem 11 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain
Σ ⊆ X . C satisﬁes any of G-RC-Q, M-R-T, M-0-T, M-RC-Q, M-R-Q, M-C-Q, M-0-Q
if and only if, whenever AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC satisfying IE and II.
Proof. In view of Theorem 3, it is suﬃcient to treat the case of G-RC-Q.
We ﬁrst prove that G-RC-Q implies the existence of an f ∈ FC which satisﬁes IE and II
provided that AC = ∅. Let R be a reﬂexive, complete and quasi-transitive G-rationalization of
C. Consider any (S, y) ∈ AC. By deﬁnition, S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \C(S). The assumption that R is
a G-rationalization of C implies the existence of x ∈ S such that (y, x) ∈ R. Deﬁne f(S, y) = x.
To show that any such function f satisﬁes IE, suppose K ∈ N, (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC ,
S0 ∈ Σ and x0 ∈ S0 are such that f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By deﬁnition,
(xk, xk−1) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Because R is reﬂexive, it must be the case that xk−1 = xk
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Thus, the completeness of R implies (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈
{1, . . . , K}. R being quasi-transitive, it follows that (x0, xK) ∈ P (R) and, thus, (xK, x0) ∈ R.
Because R is a G-rationalization of C, we obtain xK ∈ C(S0).
To prove that II is satisﬁed, suppose K ∈ N and (S0, x0), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC are such that
f(Sk, xk) = xk−1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By deﬁnition, (xk, xk−1) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Because R is reﬂexive, we have xk−1 = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and, because R is complete,
(xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. R being quasi-transitive, it follows that (x0, xK) ∈ P (R)
and hence (x0, xK) ∈ R. By deﬁnition of f , this implies f(S0, x0) = xK .
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Now suppose that, provided AC = ∅, there exists f ∈ FC satisfying IE and II. If AC =
∅, R = X × X is a reﬂexive, complete and quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C and we are
done. If AC = ∅, there exists a function f ∈ FC satisfying IE and II. Deﬁne
R = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | ∃K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that
y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x}.
To see that R is reﬂexive, let x ∈ X. If (x, x) ∈ R, there exist K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and
(S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that x = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and
xK = x. Letting S0 = SK, we obtain a contradiction to II. Thus, we must have (x, x) ∈ R.
To establish the completeness of R, suppose x, y ∈ X are such that x = y, (x, y) ∈
R and (y, x) ∈ R. By deﬁnition, this implies that there exist K,L ∈ N, x0, y0 ∈ X and
(S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK), (T 1, y1), . . . , (TL, yL) ∈ AC such that y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, xK = x, x = y0, y−1 = f(T , y) for all  ∈ {1, . . . , L} and yL = y. Let-
ting M = K + L − 1, (U0, z0) = (TL, yL), (Um, zm) = (Sm, xm) for all m ∈ {1, . . . , K}
and (Um, zm) = (Tm−K , ym−K) for all m ∈ {K + 1, . . . , K + L} \ {K + L}, it follows that
zm−1 = f(Um, zm) for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and zM = f(U0, z0), contradicting II.
Next, we show that R is quasi-transitive. Suppose three alternatives x, y, z ∈ X are such
that (x, y) ∈ P (R) and (y, z) ∈ P (R). This implies that there exist K,L ∈ N, x0, y0 ∈ X and
(S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK), (T 1, y1), . . . , (TL, yL) ∈ AC such that x = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, xK = y, y = y0, y−1 = f(T , y) for all  ∈ {1, . . . , L} and yL = z. Letting
M = K+L, z0 = x0, (Um, zm) = (Sm, xm) for all m ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (Um, zm) = (Tm−K , ym−K)
for all m ∈ {K + 1, . . . , K + L}, it follows that (z, x) ∈ R. Because R is complete, we obtain
(x, z) ∈ P (R). Thus, R is quasi-transitive.
It remains to show that R is a G-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose ﬁrst that x ∈ C(S). If there exists y ∈ S such that (x, y) ∈ R, it follows that there
exist K ∈ N, x0 ∈ X and (S1, x1), . . . , (SK, xK) ∈ AC such that y = x0, xk−1 = f(Sk, xk) for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = x. Letting S0 = S, we obtain a contradiction to IE. Therefore,
x ∈ G(S,R).
Now suppose x ∈ C(S). Let y = f(S, x). By deﬁnition, this implies (x, y) ∈ R and hence
x ∈ G(S,R).
The deﬁnition of the relation R in the above proof is based on the following intuition. Recall
that f is intended to identify, for each feasible set S and for each element y of S that is not chosen
by C, an alternative x in S such that y is not at least as good as x. Because G-rationalizability
by a reﬂexive and complete relation is considered in the above theorem, the absence of a weak
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preference of y over x is equivalent to a strict preference of x over y, that is, (x, y) ∈ P (R). In
consequence, we must have a strict preference of an alternative x over an alternative y according
to a reﬂexive and complete G-rationalization whenever x is identiﬁed by f to be responsible
for keeping y out of the set of chosen alternatives from S. Because R is also required to be
quasi-transitive, chains of strict preference have to be respected as well. In order to arrive at a
reﬂexive, complete and quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C, we deﬁne R to be composed of
all pairs (x, y) ∈ X ×X such that y does not have to be strictly preferred to x according to the
above-described criterion. The properties of f ensure that R indeed is a reﬂexive, complete and
quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C.
For the sake of easy reference, our characterization theorems are summarized in Table 1.
Each row corresponds to a rationalizability property and each column except for the last (which
identiﬁes the relevant theorem) represents a property of a function f as deﬁned earlier. An
asterisk in a cell means that the corresponding property of f is used in the characterization of
the corresponding rationalizability requirement.
G-RC-Q
DRE RE DSE IE II TheoremRI DSIDRISI
G-C-Q
G-R-Q
G-0-Q
G-RC-A
G-C-A
G-R-A
G-RC-0
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Table 1: Quasi-Transitive and P-Acyclical Rationalizability
5 Concluding Remarks
The conditions employed in our axiomatizations involve existential clauses. This is sometimes
seen as a shortcoming, but this objection, by itself, does not stand on solid ground: there is
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nothing inherently undesirable in an axiom involving existential clauses. If the argument is that
existential clauses are diﬃcult to verify in practice, this is easily countered by the observation
that universal quantiﬁers are no easier to check algorithmically than existential quantiﬁers. At
least, in the case of existential clauses, a search algorithm can terminate once one object with the
desired property is found. In this respect, our conditions compare rather favorably with those
that are required for many forms of rationalizability where universal quantiﬁers play a dominant
role.
We suspect that a major reason behind the reluctance to accept existential clauses in the
context of rational choice may be that conditions involving existential requirements are seen as
being ‘too close’ to the rationalizability property itself, because the desired property is expressed
in terms of the existence of a rationalization. This is (except for obvious cases) a matter of
judgement, of course. Our view is that the combinations of the axioms employed in the char-
acterizations of the weak forms of rationalizability represent an interesting and insightful way
of separating the properties which are necessary and suﬃcient for each class of weak rationaliz-
ability. Moreover, as is apparent from the proofs of our results, there is a substantial amount of
work to be done in order to deduce the existence of a rationalization from the mere existence of
a function f with the requisite properties. Furthermore, the axioms we use appear to be rather
clear and the roles they play in the respective results have very intuitive interpretations. Finally,
we should observe that the mathematical structures encountered here are similar to those ap-
pearing in dimension theory, which addresses the question of how many orderings are required
to express a quasi-ordering as the intersection of those orderings. Consequently, closely related
complexities cannot but arise. In fact, existential clauses appear in many of the characterization
results in that area; see, for example, Dushnik and Miller (1941).
In concluding this paper, some remarks on further problems to be explored are in order.
Because we do not impose any restrictions on the domain of a choice function (other than non-
emptiness), our results are extremely general. As a result, our theorems can be of relevance
in whatever context of rational choice as purposive behavior we may care to specify, which is
an obvious merit of our general approach. Note, however, that this approach may overlook
some meaningful further directions to explore by being insensitive to the structural properties
of the domain which may make perfect sense in the speciﬁc contexts on which we are focusing.
Some consequences of an important example of such structural properties, namely, set-theoretic
closedness assumptions, are examined in Bossert and Suzumura (2005). However, there are many
others that one might want to analyze in future work.
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